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Abstract 
Since its inception via the Federal Acquisition Streamlining Act of 1994, contractor past 
performance is intended to be an important evaluation criterion in federal source selections. 
In order to reduce performance uncertainty, procurement officials must record contractor 
performance evaluations in a central database. However, reports of ubiquitous problems 
raise questions of the integrity of ratings and the utility of the evaluations. From a literature 
review, several factors affecting the efficacy of past performance evaluations are identified. 
These factors are combined in a comprehensive conceptual model explaining past 
performance efficacy. Exploratory, qualitative data preliminarily confirms the hypotheses. Key 
antecedents include the following: rating justification quality; contractor surveillance; multi-
rater dissonance; perceived accuracy; evaluator role overload; fear of supplier dispute; 
perceived fairness; sufficiency of requirement definition; evaluator turnover; relationship 
quality; and buyer–supplier communication frequency, bi-directionality, and formality. From 
these findings, important managerial and theoretical implications are drawn and future 
research directions are identified. 
Introduction 
Industrial buyers labor to avoid the deleterious effects of the laws of agency. In 
industrial buying, the supplier serves as an agent to the principal (buying organization). 
Substantial effort is dedicated to avoid adverse selection and moral hazard. Adverse 
selection encompasses the risk of selecting an incapable supplier that otherwise 
misrepresents itself as capable, while moral hazard is the vulnerability to acts of supplier 
opportunism (Eisenhardt, 1989)—behavior that is self-interest seeking with guile 
(Williamson, 1975). For example, supplier opportunism could include shirking quality, 
obfuscating the truth, withholding information, lying, cheating, and breaching contract terms 
(Wathne & Heide, 2000). 
In their buying efforts, government agencies incur significant transaction costs 
attempting to write all-inclusive contracts and to monitor contractor performance in order to 
thwart supplier opportunism. These costs of contracting are substantial given the magnitude 
of contracted goods and services. In fiscal year (FY) 2010, the federal government awarded 
more than 5.9 million contract actions worth over $538 billion (Federal Procurement Data 
System–Next Generation [FPDS–NG, n.d.]). More transaction costs are incurred attempting 
to mitigate information asymmetries, thereby avoiding adverse selection, by requiring that 
past performance be an evaluation criterion for contract award. The logic is that by better 
informing source selection decisions, better best value selections will occur. Integrally 
related is the contractor’s performance; if performance levels are assessed and recorded, 
and if this information is available to future source selection teams, conventional wisdom 
holds that contractors will work harder to ensure satisfactory (or better) performance.  
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In U.S. federal government contracting, agencies are required to consider past 
performance information as an evaluation factor in formal source selections. Necessarily, 
then, agencies must collect and report contractor past performance information from certain 
government contracts. However, there are many concerns that the past performance 
evaluations/ratings are not properly, timely, or accurately completed. From 2007 to 2010, 
overdue assessments grew from 5.3% to 10.1% of total assessments required (Contractor 
Performance Assessment Reporting System [CPARS] Metrics, n.d.). In 2009, the 
Government Accountability Office (GAO) estimated that only 31% of contract actions 
requiring CPARS reporting had completed reports. Reports often lack sufficient information 
to support ratings (e.g., how the contractor met, exceeded, or failed to meet requirements) 
necessary to withstand a legal challenge, or do not include a rating for all performance 
areas (Office of Federal Procurement Policy [OFPP], 2011). Additionally, throughout the 
rating process, raters often inflate ratings in order to avoid conflict with the contractor (GAO, 
2009).  
Unreliable or inaccurate past performance assessments can harm contractors’ 
reputations and can bias source selections resulting in adverse selection. If past 
performance information is not reliable, and if contracting officers and evaluators do not (or 
cannot) use the information to discriminate between competitive proposals (Kelman, 2010), 
the effort of collecting and reporting the past performance information is squandered. 
Likewise, the effort of evaluating and documenting inaccurate past performance information 
during source selections is wasted. Federal contract managers are already overworked 
(GAO, 2009) and understaffed (GAO, 2001); therefore, continuing to consume time on a 
fruitless task would be futile.  
While the GAO (2009) suggested that assessments and ratings are inflated, the 
degree of inflation is unknown. Evidence suggests that the magnitude of distortion is high—
so much that contracting officers, evaluators, and source selection authorities rarely use 
past performance information as a meaningful discriminator between proposals. In order to 
determine whether this seemingly vacated faith is warranted, the degree of distortion needs 
to be assessed. The extent of distortion will tell us whether the reporting system and policy 
need to be abandoned, adjusted, or left intact.  
The purpose of the research, therefore, is to explore the efficacy of the government’s 
current use of past performance information. The intent is to diagnose alleged weaknesses 
and to explore potential improvements. The following research questions are addressed:  
1. Are past performance reports useful? How so, or why not? 
2. In the cases of multiple evaluators on a single contract action, do past 
performance evaluations/ratings deviate among evaluators, and, if so, why? 
3. Why do reviewing officials change the ratings of the evaluator (assessing 
official)? 
4. To what extent do past performance evaluations/ratings captured in federal 
databases influence source selection decisions? 
5. Why do past performance evaluations/ratings lack sufficient 
justification/supporting information? 
6. Why are past performance evaluations sometimes inaccurate? 
The answers to these six questions should help diagnose the efficacy of the 
government’s current collection and use of past performance information. The remainder of 
this paper is organized in the following manner. First, Figure 1 displays the conceptual 
framework and proposed hypotheses. The theoretical underpinnings of this model will not be 
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discussed here. Next, the study presents the research design and methodology. Lastly, 
discussion, limitations, implications, and future research directions are offered. 
 
 Conceptual Model 
Note. Ovals represent latent constructs; rectangles represent objective measures. 
Methodology 
Qualitative Data Analysis 
This research used a qualitative methodology to examine the efficacy of past 
performance evaluations. According to Yin (2009), a qualitative methodology is appropriate 
when three conditions exist: (1) The type of research question is exploratory in nature and 
takes the form of a “why” question, (2) the researcher has no control of the behavioral 
events being researched (i.e., cannot manipulate behaviors then measure results as in a 
controlled experiment), and (3) the focus is on contemporary events (p. 8). Furthermore, 
case study research is particularly useful when researchers need to provide insight and 
depth to a unique phenomenon (Ellram, 1996).  
Data Collection 
The interview protocol was developed based on a review of archival CPARs, the 
literature surrounding supplier performance evaluation, and discussions with academic 
experts and participants involved with past performance evaluations and source selections. 
In all, eight interviews were conducted. The interviews lasted between 38 and 67 minutes 
(mean 51 minutes). Each interview was recorded, then transcribed. Transcripts were then 
sent to informants for an accuracy check, thereby enhancing construct validity (Flint, 
Woodruff, & Gardial, 2002; Yin, 2009). Transcripts averaged 18 pages and 7,394 words in 
length. 
Data Analysis 
The analysis process began by identifying constructs, defining those constructs, and 
then positing relationships between them (Patrick Van Ecke, 2006). Each interview was 
examined to identify themes and then tested to determine whether these themes remained 
consistent in subsequent interviews or in reexaminations of previous interviews. The 
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participant interviews continued over a period of eight weeks. Initial coding led to new 
interviews with new participants to gain clarification and validation.  
Sample 
The sample of informants (Table 1) was drawn from the researcher’s personal 
contacts within one military service. Military and civil service employees who routinely 
evaluate contractor performance and enter these evaluations into the CPARS participated. 
These experts represented two industries that account for a large portion of the federal 
government’s portfolio of contract spending, aerospace and information technology (IT). 
Experience in evaluating contractor performance ranged from two to 28 years, and there 
was a similar wide range of the number of past performance evaluations experienced (1–
50). Most informants were program managers since they often assume responsibility for 
reporting past performance evaluations. One contracting officer with extensive experience in 
CPARS, both in reporting and evaluating CPARS during source selections, was included. 










(Number of Evaluations) 
1 Civilian Aerospace 28 Contracting 
Officer 
50+ 
2 Military Aerospace 7 Program 
Manager 
10 
3 Civilian IT 4 Program 
Manager 
11 
4 Civilian IT 10 Program 
Manager 
7 
5 Military IT 10 Program 
Manager 
5 
6 Military IT 9 Program 
Manager 
15 
7 Military IT 2 Program 
Manager 
1 




The result of each research question is discussed in sequential order followed by 
excerpts from interview informants. The meanings of the excerpts are then discussed and 
related back to the hypothesized relationships represented in the conceptual model (Figure 
1).  
1. Are past performance reports useful? How so, or why not? 
To examine whether past performance evaluations are seen as useful, we adopted 
the commonly touted utilities of past performance information to (1) reduce performance risk 
in future source selections, thereby reducing contractor performance uncertainty, and (2) 
motivate contractor performance. Of the seven informants commenting on this question, the 
results were mixed; three agreed that past performance evaluations reduce performance 
risk, while four disagreed.  
I think it could be effective at mitigating a risk if the requirements that you are 
looking at match up with the [inaudible] past performance evaluations that 
you are comparing them to. 
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This informant qualified a past performance evaluation as useful if it is relevant to the 
requirement under consideration during source selection. For source selections, relevance 
is a requisite criteria of past performance evaluations. 
It was a lot of fluff and I am afraid that unless everyone is really working these 
things to really make an impactful statement that they probably aren’t worth a 
whole lot if you have a lot of ones that just are fluffy. 
Because you can’t adequately make an assessment of a contractor’s 
potential to perform on the future based on a ball of fluff.  
These separate informants complained that a lack of specific details hindered the 
utility of past performance evaluations. In other words, a lack of details can render the 
evaluation useless. Additionally, a lack of details can render the judgment of relevance 
difficult.  
I know that it is going to be watered down kind of like the [enlisted 
performance report/officer performance report] because there is so much 
pressure that the contractor puts back on the government for wording 
intricacies. Overall, I think I would have to question the overall overarching 
fairness of the process just because just like the [enlisted performance 
report/officer performance report] system, particularly the [officer performance 
report] system you question how much reality you are getting out of this if you 
are not seeing all of these support that goes behind the ratings. That is why I 
would have to say overall I would question it. 
Drawing a parallel to Air Force military personnel performance appraisals, this 
informant essentially commented that the past performance evaluations are inflated so as to 
not harm the contractor. This comment suggests support for H10, that the efficacy of a past 
performance evaluation could be hindered by an inaccurate (i.e., inflated) report. The next 
part of this comment (i.e., “pressure”) suggests a fear of a contractor’s dispute of the 
narrative assessments and/or ratings. In the context of the conversation, this testimony 
suggests support for H11, that fear of a contractor dispute may decrease the accuracy of the 
evaluation (i.e., rating inflation). The testimony also suggests that detailed rating 
justifications are needed in order to extract value (i.e., usefulness) from the past 
performance assessment, thus, supporting H15.  
One informant commented, 
I think in concept it is not that bad. In application, it varies a lot and it is hard 
to get a total—the whole CPAR system is fair or not fair. I’ve seen it be fair in 
some places and I have seen it not be fair in some places. I have seen just a 
very mixed bag in a lot of places. I have seen some places and people 
running around with their hair on fire and it is just a task to do and they slam 
something out at the last second. 
This testimony infers that (1) there is variance in how past performance reports are 
accomplished and their quality, and (2) some assessing officials (raters) do not value the 
report—calling into question its utility. 
Of the six informants commenting on the second part of this question, four agreed 
that past performance evaluations motivate contractor performance, while one informant 
disagreed: 
I think [a past performance evaluation] does motivate contractors to a certain 
extent. 
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It can be a great tool for the PM to use to motivate the contractor. I see its 
effectiveness on that end more so than on a source selection, if you will. 
Researcher: So do you think—at least in your experience in those types of 
programs, do the CPARS tend to motivate contractors to perform? 
Informant: I would say very minimally. It became more of an exercise of they 
did what they do. Then you back into these ratings and then we had a person 
come along different up the food chain who would review those before they 
went out and had different standards for what the different colors meant. 
While results were mixed as to whether past performance evaluations reduce 
performance risk for a future contract, most informants agreed that the evaluations motivate 
contractors to perform better.  
2. In the cases of multiple evaluators on a single contract action, do past 
performance evaluations/ratings deviate among evaluators, and, if so, 
why? 
Of the five informants commenting on this question, each affirmed cases in which a 
contract involved multiple different performance evaluators (H2). One informant commented,  
Sometimes there was some real consternation, and sometimes they actually 
went outside the program team and went up to higher management to get it 
resolved. 
The informants offered a variety of explanations for differences in assessments. 
Three informants mentioned different expectations of contractor performance and poor 
requirements definition as culprits, confirming H4 and H6 (number of changes). Two 
informants attributed incongruent past performance evaluations to insufficient monitoring of 
the contractor. This supports H7. Two informants mentioned that the different government 
performance evaluators had different experiences, suggesting that individual differences 
may exist. Two informants mentioned different locations of the contracting officer’s 
representative, indicating that performance may differ at different physical sites, supporting 
H3. Two informants also agreed that work overload precludes performance evaluators from 
fulfilling their duties to evaluate and document contractor performance, supporting H16 and 
H17.  
Informant: You have only got so many resources, and I see a number of 
program offices that they are doing so many things they are driving ahead of 
their headlights.  
Researcher: So workload is an issue? 
Informant: Workload is a definite. 
The following four additional reasons for dissonance among performance evaluators 
included a lack of facts of performance levels (H9), fear of supplier dispute of the ratings, 
rater revenge, and differences in standards for ratings across evaluators (H4). 
3.  Why do reviewing officials change the ratings of the evaluator/assessing 
official)? 
When inquiring whether reviewing officials change ratings and/or narrative 
statements made by performance evaluators, the results were mixed. There appears to be 
plenty of opportunity for changes since several layers of management review a CPAR, as 
evidenced by one informant. 
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From here and my boss looks at it and he is actually the program manager, 
[inaudible]. Then we get past them to [inaudible] one, two, three—I would say 
three. Three layers. If you include the contractor who eventually has a chance 
to look at it, that is probably a fourth layer. 
Three informants confirmed the practice, while three had no experience with 
changed evaluations. For those experiencing changed ratings, reasons cited included a lack 
of facts of contractor performance and government responsibility for contractor 
nonperformance.  
Researcher: You would see narrative and ratings get changed? 
Informant: In some cases. 
Researcher: They got changed outside of what was truly accurate or earned 
or deserved? 
Informant: Many—in my opinion, many of the ratings for a long time could 
have been a lot lower if government had its act together and adequately 
supported and communicated with the contractor. 
This exchange attributes changed ratings to the government’s failure to observe or 
document contractor performance. The informant also mentioned a failure to communicate 
with the contractor.  
When discussing a fear of a contractor’s dispute (i.e., a potential claim) of a past 
performance assessment, one offeror alluded hypothetically to diminished value of the 
CPAR in achieving its intended objectives. The informant then likened a change in CPARS 
reporting presumably to a change in a source selection rating of past performance upon 
being disputed (again, presumably via a bid protest). This testimony offers some evidence 
that a fear of a contractor’s dispute is germane to the accuracy of past performance 
evaluations (H11), and associated this fear to diminished past performance efficacy (H10).  
Let’s say if this gets to a legal—if we get to the point in a CPAR—and how we 
do a CPARS or contractor assessments—to where we are concerned and it 
becomes a legal fear, then I think that the value of them will disappear and 
there will be no value in there. I say that from experience in a couple of 
situations. One of the past performance teams I led, ultimately there was a 
protest, and we successfully defended against the protest. The protest was 
denied. But, it was because we had clearly worked with legal ahead with our 
sections L and M in the RFP and we stuck by that methodology and we 
documented our methodology. And like the guy that came behind me—I 
deployed for a little while—and the guy that was leading the experience team 
took over the past performance team—he ended up spending about three 
days on the stand—of significant grilling. But because we had well-
documented processes and we had not deviated from our section L—how we 
told them we were going to evaluate them—and we could substantiate them 
in the thing, I had no fear that we were going to [inaudible]. So we had right 
on our side, so I had no fear of standing by what we had done. In another 
situation I was involved in where—in process not CPARS, but very similar, to 
where a lot of information got watered down and changed once it became a 
legal matter and legal process. 
4. To what extent do past performance evaluations/ratings captured in federal 
databases influence source selection decisions? 
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This question resembles the first part of the first research question. Question 1 
inquired whether past performance evaluations are useful to reduce performance risk on 
future contracts. These results are less mixed, with most informants believing that past 
performance evaluations do not influence source selection decisions (i.e., winner 
determinations). One informant reported no influence. Three informants reported little 
influence. One informant reported some influence, and one informant reported great 
influence.  
5. Why do past performance evaluations/ratings lack sufficient 
justification/supporting information? 
Several informants confirmed that often past performance evaluations lack sufficient 
justifications for ratings and narrative assessments. In explaining why past performance 
evaluations lack sufficient justifications, several informants identified poor documentation of 
contractor performance. Poor documentation of facts could result from excess workload or a 
lack of contractor surveillance. Thus, support is found for H19 and H23. Two informants also 
identified evaluator turnover as a culprit:  
And there is a wide variety within the system, in my experience. So you get—
and you find that out by calling back to the PMs that you can get ahold of, if 
they are still there. The older the CPARS are, obviously it is harder to find the 
people, and you clarify the information you are reading from a past 
performance perspective. 
The informant, here, referred to a high variance in quality of past performance 
assessments, so much so that in many cases, phone calls back to the program manager are 
necessary in order to validate and understand the contractor’s performance. However, this 
understanding is hindered by a turnover of personnel who generated the CPAR. Another 
informant highlighted the effect of his turnover on a CPAR: 
I was working on another project completely different from this and couldn’t 
even spell CPAR. I mean I didn’t really know what it was and all of a sudden I 
was made the program manager for a certain—for a program—and it came 
to, okay, it is time to do their CPAR. I wasn’t even—it was like, okay, I worked 
with the contractor and you know worked with the contractor to come up with 
what she wanted in the CPAR. Okay? At that point I was like, okay, I will write 
something up and send it over to them, and if it is okay with them, then we 
will send it forward and that was probably—I know now that is okay, you get 
input from them but then it is actually you writing it and then you don’t have to 
necessarily—you don’t have to always agree with what the contractor thinks 
they did. I mean sometimes you can think differently. So my first one was—
and I don’t even remember what the ratings were—I really don’t, but I know 
that first one, that was probably—I am not going to say it was wrong, but I am 
going to say it was—I couldn’t have backed up some of the stuff that was in 
there because I wasn’t working with the contractor. 
In this case, since the informant had no experience with CPARS reporting and since, 
due to his recent turnover, he was not cognizant of the contractor’s performance, he 
essentially let the contractor write its own CPAR. Thus, support is also found for H8—that 
evaluator turnover diminishes the accuracy of CPARs.  
6. Why are past performance evaluations sometimes inaccurate? 
Informants unanimously and strongly agreed that past performance evaluations, too 
often, are inaccurate. Many explanations were provided by the seven informants responding 
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to this question. Informants mentioned the following factors affecting accuracy: halo effect 
(unwillingness to taint a contractor’s record since it could effectively lock them out of future 
awards), lack of facts surrounding contractor performance, inflated ratings, performance 
evaluator turnover (H8), differing definitions of performance standards (H5), poor 
requirements definition (H5), poor oversight of contractors (H22), and the disregarding of 
some deficiency reports.  
That is very hard to get an under satisfactory from what I have seen. 
Many—in my opinion, many of the ratings for a long time could have been a 
lot lower if government had its act together and adequately supported and 
communicated with the contractor. 
Some services tend to not put much negative information in there in my 
experience. At least the ones I have read. Some of them are written more like 
a performance report where it’s bad to say anything negative. I think that—if 
that is the approach that people take, then you would take then the system 
has little value. 
These testimonies of separate informants confirm inflated ratings and the halo effect, 
which compromises accuracy. One reason underlying the inflated rating—to protect the 
contractor from a permanent scar—could be attributed to a concern for fairness, supporting 
H24. Another reason is the government’s failure to observe and document contractor 
performance (H22).  
Researcher: To what extent do you guys worry about a dispute from a 
contractor or rebuttal?  
Informant: I think the way that you address that or minimize the chance of 
that happening, you know, along the same lines of what these guys had said. 
Number one, shouldn’t be any surprises on a CPAR. CPAR should not be the 
first time that the contractor hears about an issue. Then number two, being 
objective on a CPAR. If you can trace it back to your requirements or PWS 
and you have an objective affirmation on there, I think that reduces the 
chance of that happening a lot. 
This quote suggests that, consistent with H11, the fear of a contractor’s dispute of 
the ratings or narrative assessments influences performance evaluators to collect and 
document supporting facts. These fact-based evaluations should improve the accuracy of 
the past performance evaluation.  
There were other things that were like, well, they didn’t perform as well as we 
wanted them to, but we couldn’t ding them on it because nowhere in the 
contract did it specifically say this is your standard and this is where you have 
to meet it or exceed it. 
Researcher: Does anybody have any experiences with accuracy—you know, 
issues of accuracy of the CPARS that you could tie back to something like a 
poorly defined requirement or not the proper amount of oversight or 
surveillance to the contractor?  
Informant: We have seen a few of those things which makes the 
documentation part harder—or not documentation, but the supporting 
arguments harder, when you say, “Okay, well their requirement is this.” Well, 
how do you meet that because you can’t even define that? 
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These quotes suggest that sometimes performance requirements are not sufficiently 
defined in order to collect facts and compare them to contractual requirements. Thus, 
support is found for H5.  
The division leadership and this particular organization has pushed down a 
culture that lends itself to that evidence in writing CPARS. You know the 
division staff pushes it down to the branch level, and the branch reviewers 
push that down too. So that is the first thing they look for when they are 
reviewing the write ups is, okay, now give me the four examples. You know if 
you have gone above and beyond, give me an example of that. If you have a 
lack of communication, give me examples of that. So that is a culture that has 
been pushed down to this division and that is the expectation that is 
displayed. The reason for that is we don’t want to go down the road for 
dispute. That is our defense mechanism in this particular division. 
So we work hard in this division to have the evidence within the CPAR so it 
doesn’t get disputed down the road if we run into issues.  
This testimony confirms a fear of a supplier dispute, and demonstrates that this fear 
influences performance evaluators to bolster the justifications of their past performance 
ratings and narratives.  
Yes, when I was [in] the last program office that I was in, we had our support 
contractor, and we were meeting with that contractor virtually through email 
and through telephone conversation multiple times a week and constantly 
giving feedback. So when it was CPARS time, there were no surprises. 
Actually it didn’t even get disputed, and we had a couple of areas where we 
had a few markdowns and we had the data, and that is the important thing in 
writing is the data to back it up. You know, dates and documented evidence, 
if you will, [inaudible] come to that for an area that they may have been 
lacking in. So it wasn’t a surprise, just to my [inaudible] it was not a surprise 
for the [inaudible] contractor to get the CPAR that they did. It was constant 
feedback and that was just in the way of the working relationship. 
This exchange suggests an association between the buyer–supplier relationship and the 
quality and frequency of communications. The informant mentioned no surprises and no 
disputes from the contractor due to the communication. This insinuates that the evaluations 
were accurate and that there is, therefore, little concern for a supplier dispute. Thus, some 
support appears reasonable that, consistent with H20, relationship quality affects a fear of a 
dispute (which, in turn, affects the accuracy of the past performance evaluation).  
Nonetheless, there appears to be significant variance in the rigor, frequency, quality, 
and amount of performance feedback across contracts. These features of communication 
vary by individual program managers, contract managers, CORs, or end users. This 
variance lends credence to H12, H13, and H14, which posit relationships between features 
of communication and past performance evaluation accuracy. 
In general, qualitative interview data largely supports the conceptual model lending 
content validity. Informants did not specifically identify associations between past 
performance efficacy and evaluator dissonance (H1). Nor did they explicitly link CPAR 
usefulness to past performance rating justifications (H18). Most of these relationships are, 
however, implicit in the conversations. Explicit support discussed above was found for the 
remaining 21 hypotheses. 
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Discussion 
Since its inception via the Federal Acquisition Streamlining Act of 1994 (Beausoleil, 
2010), contractor past performance is intended to be an important evaluation criterion in 
federal source selections. The purpose was to level the playing field between the 
government and the contractors to mitigate information asymmetries. With more complete 
knowledge of contractor performance, agencies can mitigate adverse selection.  
However, there are many concerns that the past performance evaluations/ratings are 
not properly, timely, or accurately completed. Reports often lack sufficient information to 
support ratings (e.g., how the contractor exceeded or failed to meet requirements) 
necessary to withstand a legal challenge or do not include a rating for all performance areas 
(OFPP, 2011). Additionally, throughout the rating process, raters often inflate ratings in 
order to avoid conflict with the contractor (GAO, 2009).  
Unreliable or inaccurate past performance assessments can harm contractors’ 
reputations and can bias source selections, resulting in adverse selection. If past 
performance information is not reliable, and if contracting officers and evaluators don’t use it 
in discriminating between competitive proposals, the effort of collecting and reporting the 
past performance information is squandered. Likewise, the effort of evaluating and 
documenting inaccurate past performance information during source selections is wasted. 
Evidence suggests that the magnitude of distortion is high—so much that contracting 
officers, evaluators, and source selection authorities rarely use past performance 
information as a meaningful discriminator between proposals. In order to determine whether 
this seemingly vacated faith is warranted, the degree of distortion was examined.  
The purpose of the research was to explore the efficacy of the government’s current 
use of past performance information. The intent was to diagnose alleged weaknesses and to 
explore potential improvements. This research used a qualitative methodology to examine 
these research questions. From a literature review, a conceptual model of 24 hypotheses 
was developed. Eight subject matter experts who routinely evaluate contractor performance 
and enter these evaluations into the CPARS were interviewed to explore the relationships 
posited in the model. While employing only a limited, qualitative, empirical test of the 
propositions, the research provides managers with some tentative guidance. 
Managerial Implications 
This research confirmed much of what has been reported in GAO and OFPP reports. 
However, the research took the next step to explain why the systemic weaknesses occur 
(e.g., inflated ratings, poor justifications, etc.). In doing so, several novel causal factors 
emerged. For example, some main findings centered around the dissonance among multiple 
performance evaluators on a single contract. Another major finding entailed the accuracy of 
evaluations and how the characteristics of channel communication play such an important 
role in accuracy. The findings herein introduce a plethora of implications for acquisition 
management, discussion of which follows.  
First, dissonance across performance evaluators suggests that contractors should 
pay attention to evaluator dissent and develop strategies to manage each of the buyer’s 
agents’ interpretations of its performance. Government acquisition teams and contractors 
might benefit from discussing during the post-award conference precisely how a situation of 
dissent among multiple evaluators will be managed. Additionally, since evaluator workload 
can affect the due diligence applied to performance evaluations, contractors could devise 
strategies to make the evaluators’ jobs less arduous. For example, contractors can, and 
sometimes do, preempt the CPAR by writing their own versions of evaluations and offer 
these evaluations to evaluators, program managers, and contracting officers. The 
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unintended consequence of this practice, however, is the buyer’s propensity to apply less 
effort in its duties to independently monitor and scrutinize performance. Where buyer–
supplier trust is high and where contractor performance is high and reliable, this practice of 
essentially outsourcing performance evaluations poses less risk. Agencies should, however, 
weigh the conflict of interest posed and set boundaries for this practice since it invites risk of 
artificially inflated assessments. 
The research also offers explanations for dissenting evaluations among multiple 
performance evaluators. For example, leaders should manage evaluator workload to ensure 
they have sufficient time to perform their past performance evaluation duties. Manning 
models should be more precisely developed to account for not only dollars obligated and the 
number of contracts awarded annually, but other time-consuming tasks such as the quantity 
of past performance evaluations. This research reveals that, on average, past performance 
evaluations consume nearly two man-weeks of effort. Leaders should also devise means to 
ensure that requirements—including measurements of success and precise definitions of 
CPAR ratings tailored to the requirement—are sufficiently defined prior to solicitation. These 
definitions should be reviewed at the post-award conference. Where interpretation can vary 
among evaluators, different expectations of contractor performance can emerge and fester. 
Likewise, the number of changes should not be excessive since this, too, can result in 
confusion as to what is required by the contractor, particularly on high-value, complex 
requirements. Inter-rater dissonance may also be reduced by ensuring that past 
performance assessments and ratings are more fact-based (i.e., more accurate) since it is 
difficult to disagree with documented facts. Finally, leaders can reduce dissonance with 
more proper surveillance of the contractor’s work. 
A central construct affecting past performance efficacy appears to be the accuracy of 
the evaluations. Accuracy was found to be affected by many fairly obvious factors that have 
been discussed in the literature, such as increased surveillance, feedback quality, 
communication bi-directionality, communication formality, and fear of a supplier dispute 
(resulting in a halo effect). These results suggest that more surveillance and performance-
level measurement should be conducted in order to observe and collect the requisite facts. 
Thus, requiring activities should develop metrics to assess contractor performance and 
schedules for measurement.  
The results also suggest that past performance reporting is often not a sufficient 
surrogate for contractor performance management. More frequent, formal, and two-way 
communication with the contractor is usually required, as affirmed by Steve Kelman’s (2010) 
recommendations to improve past performance information collection and use. Thus, 
acquisition teams relying on the CPARS system as the sole feedback mechanism may 
sacrifice accuracy and, in turn, past performance efficacy.  
This research highlights the limitation of CPARS and a gap in federal procurement 
management. There is no single structured IT system and process to systematically collect, 
store, and synthesize contractor performance information. This is one reason why the 
government struggles so much to effectively manage service contracts. Supplier 
performance management systems are common in the for-profit sector. Examples include 
Iasta’s SmartSupplier scorecard tool, SAP/Ariba’s Supplier Performance Management 
module, and BravoSolution’s Supplier Performance Management tool. These structured, 
web-enabled tools could standardize metrics, performance data recording, analysis, and 
reporting. They also offer dashboard-like scorecards to assess individual contractors and 
groups of contractors (e.g., by commodity family or by industry). Such a structured tool could 
alleviate many of the weaknesses that deteriorate past performance accuracy, enable 
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inadequate assessment justifications, and foster rater dissonance, while bolstering the 
government’s ability to manage contractors’ delivered performance levels.  
In addition, several unsuspecting, novel factors emerged that explain past 
performance evaluation (in)accuracy. For example, informants attributed lower accuracy to 
evaluator turnover. This could be due to lower accountability for doing thorough work in 
observing and documenting contractor performance. Turnover can also exacerbate the 
problems caused by work overload. Thus, leaders should mitigate turnover of performance 
evaluators, particularly on complex contracts. Policy could also be enacted to require 
outgoing evaluators to conduct an interim CPAR prior to departure so that the new evaluator 
can begin—and assume accountability for assessing—performance evaluation at the 
beginning of a full evaluation period. Accuracy of past performance assessments was also 
affected by insufficiently defined requirements. It is difficult to assess that which is not 
understood or that which can have multiple interpretations. Thus, contracting officers and 
program managers should not move forward in contracting with ill-defined requirements. 
Additionally, contractors should strive to ensure that the buyer thoroughly defines 
requirements. An independent agency requirements ombudsman could help in this regard.  
Perhaps the most novel finding is that the buyer’s perceived fairness of the 
evaluation affects the accuracy of evaluations. This fairness can work for or against the 
contractor—depending on the buyer’s assessment of what the contractor deserves. On the 
positive side, many informants likened the one-shot, summary rating that is supposed to 
reflect many instances of performance to an employee’s annual performance appraisal. In 
other words, evaluators felt it unfair to rate a contractor as below satisfactory for a single 
instance of a performance failure in cases where there were many other performance 
opportunities. Similarly, performance evaluators were reluctant to give a below satisfactory 
rating singularly because of the impact to the contractor’s ability to secure future 
government business. In addition to fear of a supplier dispute to ratings, this phenomenon 
confirms a halo effect. Conversely, on the negative side, some performance evaluators 
seemed to use the past performance rating as leverage—either as a threat to a contractor 
during performance and prior to a CPAR or as a means to punish a contractor following poor 
performance (i.e., revenge). The former was particularly acute involving contracts in which 
the government was locked in and had little relative bargaining power compared to that of 
the contractor (e.g., sole source contracts and those with high switching costs).  
Theoretical Implications 
Agency theory has been applied to many facets of buyer–supplier exchange 
relationships. In this study, two dimensions of agency operate simultaneously, and a third 
novel dimension emerged. First, the contractor is considered an agent of the buyer in 
promulgating the buyer’s mission. Second, the buyer (i.e., the government team) is 
comprised of multiple agents to itself. In the case of multiple evaluators in different 
organizations of the government, multiple agency relationships exist, and each can hold 
different interests. The third unsuspected dimension of agency pertains to the program (i.e., 
the requirement). In some cases, both government performance evaluators and contractor 
employees could begin to identify more with the program than with their employer. In other 
words, sometimes, what is advantageous for the program can supersede what is 
advantageous for either the government or the contractor. This explains the halo effect 
afforded a contractor who fails in one instance of performance yet the government evaluator 
does not mention the failure in the past performance evaluation because of a reluctance to 
taint the program or the contractor’s chance for future business. Thus, there appears to be 
opportunity to examine the antecedents and consequences of quasi-agency relationships to 
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understand under what circumstances such a quasi-agency emerges and the resultant 
effects. 
Study Limitations  
The obvious limitation of this paper is the lack of a quantitative test of the 
hypotheses. Thus, while serving as a foundation, future research should expand and test 
the propositions. These propositions lend themselves well to cross-sectional data collected 
via survey. The quantitative data could be analyzed using various multivariate models such 
as structural equation modeling. The research also employed a limited number of interviews. 
While rich insights were gleaned from experienced informants, other related phenomenon 
may be omitted with a narrow sample.  
Future Research Directions 
Future research should quantitatively test the hypotheses developed herein. Such a 
comprehensive model with many variables and successive dependent variables could be 
tested via structural equation modeling. Additionally, since the scope of this study was 
restricted to explaining past performance efficacy (i.e., its antecedents), the consequences 
of an effective past performance system should be empirically explored. In other words, 
does a more effective past performance system result in better source selection decisions, 
better contractor performance, and more efficient sourcing?  
Future research could also expand the context of the study. This research was 
constrained to the federal government sector. Research could examine the extent to which 
the phenomenon occurs in the for-profit sector, and could examine differences in 
relationships among variables attributed to the differences in sectors. Hence, is the business 
sector a moderator for any of the hypothesized relationships?  
Future research could also delve into situations in which performance evaluators 
empathize with the contractor to an extent that they are willing to inflate ratings and 
assessments. In other cases, we see just the opposite; performance evaluators are willing to 
use the past performance evaluation as a sort of punishment in a vengeful way. It would be 
interesting to understand why different evaluators in different situations take such different 
approaches.  
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